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Goal-Directed Behavior
Claire M. Gillan, Sharon Morein-Zamir, Muzaffer Kaser, Naomi A. Fineberg, Akeem Sule,
Barbara J. Sahakian, Rudolf N. Cardinal, and Trevor W. RobbinsBackground: Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is a disorder of automatic, uncontrollable behaviors and obsessive rumination.
There is evidence that OCD patients have difficulties performing goal-directed actions, instead exhibiting repetitive stimulus-response
habit behaviors. This might result from the excessive formation of stimulus-response habit associations or from an impairment in the
ability to use outcome value to guide behavior. We investigated the latter by examining counterfactual decision making, which is the
ability to use comparisons of prospective action-outcome scenarios to guide economic choice.
Methods: We tested decision making (forward counterfactual) and affective responses (backward counterfactual) in 20 OCD patients
and 20 matched healthy control subjects using an economic choice paradigm that previously revealed attenuation of both the
experience and avoidance of counterfactual emotion in schizophrenia patients and patients with orbitofrontal cortex lesions.
Results: The use of counterfactual comparison to guide decision making was diminished in OCD patients, who relied primarily on
expected value. Unlike the apathetic affective responses previously shown to accompany this decision style, OCD patients reported
increased emotional responsivity to the outcomes of their choices and to the counterfactual comparisons that typify regret and relief.
Conclusions: Obsessive-compulsive disorder patients exhibit a pattern of decision making consistent with a disruption in goal-directed
forward modeling, basing decisions instead on the temporally present (and more rational) calculation of expected value. In contrast to
this style of decision making, emotional responses in OCD were more extreme and reactive than control subjects. These results are in
line with an account of disrupted goal-directed cognitive control in OCD.Key Words: Behavioral neuroscience, decision-making, goal-
directed, habit, obsessive-compulsive disorder, regret
P
eople with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) suffer
from an irresistible need to perform certain acts to avoid
feared consequences. The consequences are typically the
subject of intrusive, obsessive thoughts (1). These compulsions
are futile acts that, due to the intensity and frequency with which
they must be performed, over time become destructive rather
than protective. Despite recognizing that these actions are
unnecessary and wishing to stop, OCD patients cannot control
their behavior fully. They are unable to resist the immediate urge
to perform a compulsion, even though the consequences of
capitulation are in the long run often worse than the typically
transient experience of anxiety (2). This impairment in making
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and habit (3,4).
It remains to be seen if this deficit results from accelerated
(stimulus-response) habit formation in OCD or from a failure to
use prospective outcomes to guide action choice. In this experi-
ment, we adopted a computational psychiatry approach (5) to
investigate the latter hypothesis, using a mathematical model of
economic behavior containing parameters that previously have
been shown to engage key brain regions implicated in goal-
directed behavior and OCD, the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), and
caudate nucleus (6,7). We tested if OCD patients and control
subjects differ in the extent to which they utilize the comparison
of counterfactual action-outcome scenarios in decision making.
By using this paradigm, we could assess the contribution of goal-
directed control deficits to OCD in a manner independent of
stimulus-response habit formation (which typically arises through
behavioral repetition).
Economic decision making is not only guided by expected
utility, it is heavily influenced by “what if” scenarios that affect
emotion (8,9). Counterfactual thinking occurs when we consider
fictive scenarios and compare our current situation to these
imagined alternatives. Emotions such as regret are experienced
when we engage in upward counterfactual thinking, observing
that our current situation is worse than an alternative that could
have been, had we acted differently (10). Past experiences of
regret cause individuals to adjust their behavior to avoid this
emotion, and like goal-directed behavior, this function is medi-
ated by the OFC and the striatum (11–14). Interestingly, humans
typically choose to avoid potential regret, even if it means
making an economically suboptimal choice (15,16).BIOL PSYCHIATRY 2014;75:639–646
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Table 1. Group Demographics
Control Subjects OCD F df p
Age 46.6 (13.5) 44.25 (8.4) 1 1,37 ns
NART 16.2 (10.75) 15.1 (7.41) 1 1,37 ns
Y-BOCS Total 21.5 (5.91)
Obsessions 10.45 (3.83)
Compulsions 11.05 (3.23)
MADRS 1.4 (2.09) 7.5 (6.08) 17.99 1,37 .001
OCI-R 7.05 (5.97) 31.25 (14.03) 48.16 1,37 .001
STAI-State 28.42 (5.58) 39 (11.75) 12.67 1,37 .001
STAI-Trait 31.37 (7.21) 55.9 (9.68) 79.41 1,37 .001
Mean values and standard deviations are presented in parentheses.
Questionnaire data from one control subject were lost due to technical
error.
MADRS, Montgomery-A˚sberg Depression Rating Scale; NART, National
Adult Reading Test; ns, not significant; OCD, obsessive-compulsive
disorder; OCI-R, Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory-Revised; STAI, State-Trait
Anxiety Inventory; Y-BOCS, Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale.
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of counterfactual dysfunction, experiencing attenuated regret
and failing to make choices consistent with its avoidance (17,18).
In other experimental studies, OFC-lesion patients typically show
little cognitive impairment but consistently fail to consider and
learn from negative consequences of actions, preferring imme-
diate reward (19–21). Schizophrenia, a psychiatric disorder involv-
ing orbitofrontal dysfunction (22), is also associated with
diminished regret and failure to use anticipated regret to guide
future decisions (18,23,24). This deficit is thought to be respon-
sible for some goal-directed decision-making problems in the
disorder, along with social dysfunction and a lack of emotional
accountability for prior actions (25).
Although some decision-making deficits associated with OCD
are similar to those seen in schizophrenia and following OFC lesions,
such as impairment in inhibitory control over behavior (26–28),
the affective phenotype of obsessions and anxiety distinguish OCD
from these disorders in other ways. Obsessive-compulsive disorder
patients have an inflated sense of personal responsibility (29),
thought to exacerbate the experience of regret (30). In addition,
depression and anxiety, which commonly co-occur with OCD (31),
are associated with excessive or unrealistic counterfactual thoughts,
hypothesized to cause rumination (32–36). However, it should be
noted that one study recently reported attenuated regret in
depressed subjects (37).
We hypothesized that OCD patients would exhibit deficient
use of counterfactual forward models of action-outcome alter-
natives in decision making. However, given the considerable
affective component to OCD, we hypothesized that, unlike OFC-
lesioned patients, affective responses to backward counterfac-
tuals (e.g., the difference between what was won and what could
have been won, had they acted differently) would be exagger-
ated in OCD. To test these hypotheses, we examined OCD
patients and matched healthy control subjects on a modified
version of the regret task employed by Camille et al. (14). We
presented choices between two money wheels that varied in
expected value and their potential to evoke the extremes of
emotion (e.g., regret/relief) at the time of outcome presentation.
We examined the contribution of these parameterized variables
to choice behavior to test the hypothesis that decision making in
OCD would not be sensitive to projected (forward) counterfactual
scenarios. Affective responses were recorded, when the out-
comes of choice were revealed, to examine the effect of
counterfactual comparison on emotional response.Methods and Materials
Participants
Twenty OCD patients and 20 healthy matched control sub-
jects took part in this study on the day of testing. Detailed
recruitment and demographic particulars are available in
Supplement 1. Groups were matched for gender, age, and verbal
IQ, using the National Adult Reading Test (38) (Table 1). Nineteen
OCD patients were medicated, predominantly with selective
serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs). As expected, groups dif-
fered significantly in terms of OCD symptom severity on the
Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory-Revised (39) and Montgomery-
A˚sberg Depression Rating Scale (MADRS) (40) and in terms of
state anxiety and trait anxiety assessed using the State-Trait
Anxiety Inventory (41). Patients with depression scores exceeding
12 on the MADRS (a score indicating very few symptoms) were
excluded during recruitment. Nevertheless, two patientswww.sobp.org/journalpresented on the day with scores exceeding our cutoff (moderate
scores of 22).
Procedure
The task employed was based on the gambling paradigms
previously used by Camille et al. (14) and Chase et al. (37). The aim
of this task was to maximize points, which would later be converted
to money. Subjects were not told the precise relationship between
points and money, and all received £4. On each of 80 trials, subjects
chose between two wheels that displayed potential gains and losses
and their respective probabilities. Each wheel offered two of the
following possible outcomes: 210, 70, 70, or 210; each
potential outcome’s probability was illustrated by the proportion
of the circle occupied by that outcome and could be .25, .5, or .75
(Figure 1). Once subjects had selected a wheel, it was highlighted.
On 50 of trials, subjects had the opportunity to change their mind
and switch wheels. Once the final selection was made, a ball began
to move within each wheel. After 1.5 seconds, the ball stopped on
one of the segments in each wheel, determining the value that the
subject had won (obtained outcome) and the value the subject
could have won had they chosen differently. Before the ball
stopped, the nonselected wheel faded to black so that the final
result for the nonselected wheel was obscured. It was not possible
to extrapolate the final result, as the initial spin path bore no
relation to the outcome. At this partial feedback stage, subjects
rated their affective response to what they had obtained on a visual
analogue scale that ranged from extremely disappointed to
extremely pleased. After subjects had completed rating 1, the
outcome of the nonselected wheel came into view. Subjects rated
their affective responses again at this full feedback stage. Following
this, the subjects’ total score was presented on screen.
Ratings taken immediately after the outcome of the subject’s
choice was revealed reflected the contribution of a simple chance-
based counterfactual (“what if the ball had landed on the other
segment of my wheel?”) to emotion. The second emotional rating,
which was taken when the outcome of the wheel that was not
selected was revealed, reflected the influence of an agency
counterfactual of regret/relief (“what if I’d chosen the other
wheel?”) on affective response. To reduce the variance between
subjects, obtained and nonobtained outcomes were predeter-
mined (i.e., not random) and all subjects received the same trial
sequence. Outcomes were closely in line with the presented
probabilities and were fair such that on a given trial, the more
Figure 1. Trial structure of gambling task. The complete list of trials presented to subjects is provided in Supplement 1 (Table S3).
Figure 2. (A) Rating regression parameters: obtained outcome ¼ k;
chance counterfactual ¼ k  j; agent counterfactual ¼ k  l. (B) Decision-
making model notation. Outcome x is always the larger (x1  y1 and
x2  y2).
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likely one was to avoid regret (Figure S1 in Supplement 1).
Data Analysis
Affective Responses. Affective responses were analyzed
using linear mixed-effects models. Group (OCD, control) is a
fixed-effect factor, trial outcomes (values and counterfactual
computations defined below) are continuous fixed-effect predic-
tors, and subject is a random effect factor.
We conducted two separate analyses, one for rating 1
(following partial feedback) and one for rating 2 (following
complete feedback). For rating 1, we modeled the influence of
1) the value of the obtained outcome; and 2) the chance
counterfactual, which is the difference between what was
obtained and what could have been obtained had the ball landed
in the alternate segment (obtained outcome  nonobtained out-
come from that same wheel) (Figure 2). For rating 2, we modeled the
influence of 1) the value of the obtained outcome; and 2) the agent
counterfactual, which is the difference between what was obtained
and what could have been obtained had the subject chosen the
other wheel (obtained outcome  nonobtained outcome from the
nonselected wheel).
Analyses were performed in R version 2.14.1 (http://www.
r-project.org/) using the lme4::lmer function to derive parameter
estimates and languageR::pvals.fnc to obtain significance tests for
mixed-effects models using Markov chain Monte Carlo simula-
tions (42).
Decision Making
A model of counterfactual choice behavior similar to that
previously used in other variants of this task (11,17) was fitted to
subjects’ wheel selections (equation 4). Specifically, we assessed
the influence of three parameters hypothesized to guide decision
making: expected value (e: equation 1), variance or risk
(v: equation 2), and prospective future regret (r: equation 3).
To construct these models, the possible outcomes and
associated probabilities were ascribed the following notation: x1www.sobp.org/journal
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x1  y1. Similarly, x2 and y2 refer the two possible outcomes of
wheel 2 (W2), with x2  y2. p and 1-p are the respective
probabilities of earning x1 and y1 and likewise q and 1-q are
the respective probabilities associated with earning x2 and y2
(Figure 2B). Using this notation, the three decision-making
parameters (e, v, and r) were calculated. The parameter that
maximizes expected value (EV) is denoted e and is calculated by
subtracting the EV of W2 from the EV of W1. If this value is
positive, then someone seeking to choose the wheel with the
greater EV should choose W1. The EV of W1 is calculated using:
[px1  (1–p)y1]. The e parameter is thus defined as:
e ¼ EVW1  EVW2 ¼ p*x1 1 pð Þ*y1
 
 q*x2 1 qð Þ*y2
  ð1Þ
The avoidance of risk parameter is simply the comparison of
the relative variance within each wheel. The equation for the risk
associated with W1 is p * (x1  EVW1)2  (1-p)(y1  EVW1)2. A high
value indicates that someone seeking to avoid risk should avoid
this wheel. The final avoidance of risk parameter (v) is calculated
by subtracting the risk associated with W1 from that associated
with W2. If the value is positive, then someone trying to avoid risk
should choose wheel 1:
v ¼ vw2  vw1 ¼ q* x2  EVW2ð Þ2 1-qð Þ y2  EVW2
 2h i
 p* x1  EVW1ð Þ2 1-pð Þ y1  EVW1
 2h i ð2Þ
The anticipated regret calculation takes into account the
magnitude of the difference between the lowest and the highest
outcomes across the two wheels (see Supplement 1 for
expanded rationale). This calculation is based on the assumption
that the greater the difference between what is obtained and
what could have been obtained had one chosen differently, the
greater the experience of regret/relief. Subjects can minimize the
likelihood of experiencing future regret/relief (r) by making the
choice that is associated with the smallest differences, i.e.,
choosing W1 if the outcome of the following equation is positive
and choosing W2 if it is negative:
r ¼ y1  x2
  y2  x1
  ð3Þ
Using these three parameters, the probability of choosing
wheel 1 (Pw1it), where t denotes trial (or time) and i denotes
individual, is calculated using:
P W1itð Þ ¼ 1 P W2itð Þ ¼ F vit; rit; eitð Þ ð4Þ
F is the inverse logit function, F(y) ¼ ey(1  ey) and y is the
logit predicted by the individual values of v, r, and e in the
logistic regression. Previous studies using this methodology have
included a disappointment parameter (d), which is similar to and
indeed correlated with (r ¼ .607, p  .001), the risk parameter
(11,17,18). The risk measure (v) was selected, as it is a more
accurate measure of within-wheel variance, and unlike d, it is
independent of expected value and regret. This parameter
allowed us to test for the possibility that OCD patients’ behavior
was excessively risk-averse. For the purposes of cross-study
comparison, however, a model with d instead of v is presented
in Supplement 1. None of the main results reported below
change with the replacement of v by d.
In keeping with previous studies (11,17,18), within-subjects
logistic regression analysis was performed using the lme4::lmerwww.sobp.org/journalfunction, with the model Choicev  r  e  Group:v 
Group:r  Group:e  (19Subject) and subgroup models Choice
v  r  e  (19Subject). Choice is a binary variable, coded 1 for
wheel1 and 0 for wheel2; group is a fixed-effect factor; subject is a
random-effect factor; e, v, and r are continuous fixed-effect
predictors. Where appropriate, estimated effects from the full
model were confirmed with a likelihood ratio test, directly
comparing models with and without the term of interest (using
the stats::anova function). Logit and inverse logit functions are
defined as logit(y) ¼ ln[y/(1  y)] and invlogit(y) ¼ ey/(ey  1),
such that invlogit[logit(y)] ¼ y. Pearson’s product moment
correlations were computed between symptom severity ratings
in the OCD group and the slope of predictors from the affective
rating and decision-making models. A one-way analysis of
variance was used to test if OCD patients were more prone to
switching wheels than control subjects. Results were considered
significant with p  .05.Results
Affect Ratings with Partial Feedback
In line with previous data, there was a significant effect for
obtained outcome across all participants, p ¼ .0001, with more
positive ratings with a greater value obtained. The chance
counterfactual in the model (the difference between the
obtained outcome and what could have been won had the
ball landed elsewhere) was also significant, p ¼ .0001. There
was no main effect of group and OCD patients’ overall ratings
were no more positive or negative than control subjects’
overall ratings (p ¼ .187). However, OCD patients’ emotional
responses were more strongly influenced by the obtained
result than control subjects (group  obtained outcome,
p ¼ .0018) (Figure 3A), feeling more pleased when the out-
come was good and more disappointed when it was bad. The
chance counterfactual did not differentially modulate affective
responses between groups, p ¼ .992 (Figure 3B). Finally, there
was no correlation between OCD symptom severity (Yale-
Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale [Y-BOCS]) and the slope
of the obtained outcome parameter, Pearson’s r(20) ¼ .131,
p ¼ .581. In sum, OCD patients showed more extreme affective
reactions to the value they won or lost.
Subjective Affect Ratings with Complete Feedback
At complete feedback, when subjects were shown what they
would have won/lost had they acted differently, both the
obtained outcome and the agent counterfactual (the difference
between the obtained outcome and the outcome of the non-
selected wheel) were significant, p ¼ .0001, in each case. There
was no interaction between group and obtained outcome at this
stage, p ¼ .2112 (Figure 3C). There was, however, a significant
group by agent counterfactual interaction, p ¼ .0001 (Figure 3D).
Obsessive-compulsive disorder patients’ affective ratings were
more strongly influenced by the agent counterfactual relative to
healthy control subjects, with the rating more extreme when this
difference was either positive or negative. There was no
significant correlation between overall Y-BOCS score and the
slope of the agent counterfactual r(20) ¼ .1, p ¼ .624. To
summarize, at the second rating, OCD patients showed greater
sensitivity to the regret counterfactual than healthy control
subjects and there was no longer a difference between the
groups on the influence of the value of the obtained outcome on
affective ratings.
Figure 3. Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) patients show more extreme affective responses to wins/losses and to regret/relief than control subjects. The left
panels show the effect of the value of the predictors (A) obtained outcome and (B) chance counterfactual (obtained outcome  nonobtained outcome from that
wheel: k  j in Figure 2A) on rating 1, following partial feedback. The right panels depict the effect of the predictors (C) obtained outcome and (D) agent
counterfactual (obtained outcome  outcome from the nonselected wheel: k  l in Figure 2A) on rating 2, following complete feedback. NS, nonsignificant.
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We tested for group differences in the degree to which the
avoidance of regret and risk and the promotion of expected
value predicted choice behavior. To summarize the main finding,
the use of counterfactual comparison of projected action-
outcome alternatives, i.e., the avoidance of future regret, was
attenuated in OCD patients compared with control subjects,
whereas expected value influenced choice equally in both groups
(Figure 4; Table 2). This was evidenced by a significant interaction
between group and r but no interaction between group and e
(Table 2). On further exploration of these effects (by modeling the
two groups individually), we observed that anticipated regret was
a stronger predictor of wheel choice in control subjects com-
pared with OCD patients (Table 2). Expected value predicted
choice behavior in both groups, with patients and control
subjects alike showing a tendency to choose wheels based on
the likelihood of winning the most points possible. The risk
avoidance parameter did not significantly contribute to the
model, and the interaction with group and risk was not
significant and was therefore removed (Supplement 1). Goodness
of fit of the e, r model was determined using Nagelkerke’s R2,
giving R2 ¼ .303 (43). There was no difference in the overall
points earned by each group (OCD: mean [M] ¼ 763, SD ¼ 553;
control: M ¼ 770, SD ¼ 778, F  1). Additional analyses, includingthe effect of task experience over time on decision making, are
presented in Supplement 1 for the interested reader.
There was no correlation between Y-BOCS scores and the slope
of the e (Pearson’s r ¼ .177, p ¼ .624) or r (Pearson’s r ¼ .07,
p ¼ .77) parameters in OCD patients. Likewise, there were no
significant correlations between the slopes of any decision-making
and affective parameters, indicating that emotional reactivity was
unrelated to emotional decision making in OCD, e.g., the degree to
which regret influenced affective rating did not correlate with the
influence of avoidance of regret on wheel choice, Pearson’s r(20)
¼ .307, p ¼ .197. There was no effect of verbal IQ on the use of
expected value, Pearson’s r(40) ¼ .212, p ¼ .37, or avoidance of
regret, Pearson’s r ¼ .175, p ¼ .461, to guide choice, and no
correlation between IQ and Y-BOCS, r ¼ .065, p ¼ .786. There were
no correlations between depressive symptom severity scores and
coefficients from the aforementioned models in the OCD group, all
ps  .31. We repeated our modeling analyses excluding the two
patients presenting with high MADRS scores on the day of testing
and the results were unaffected.
Discussion
Using a mathematical model of choice, we found that the use
of counterfactual comparisons of action-outcome alternatives towww.sobp.org/journal
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Figure 4. Plots indicating the effect of a given predictor for groups obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) and control, according to the regression model,
when all other predictors are at zero. For a given predictor X (taking values avoidance of regret [r] and expected value [e]), the ordinate for the regression
lines is invlogit(Y), where Y ¼ a  bX; b is the logistic regression coefficient for X from the full model; and a is the intercept.
644 BIOL PSYCHIATRY 2014;75:639–646 C.M. Gillan et al.guide decision making is diminished in OCD patients. This deficit
is reminiscent of that found in patients with OFC lesions and
schizophrenia. These patients not only fail to avoid future regret
but also have a blunted experience of regret consistent with the
notion that these disorders have a general failure to compute
counterfactuals (17,18). In contrast, we found that OCD patients’
emotional responses to regret counterfactuals were even more
extreme than those of healthy control subjects. When the
outcome of the wheel that they had not selected was revealed,
OCD patients’ affective ratings were more strongly influenced by
the agent counterfactual, i.e., the difference between what was
won and what could have been won had they chosen differently.
Therefore, unlike OFC-lesioned and schizophrenia patients, OCD
patients actually feel the pang of regret and the joy of relief more
acutely than healthy control subjects. These results suggest thatTable 2. Model of Choice Behavior Using Binary Logistic Regression with Ind
Parameter Coefficient
(A) Choice Model with All Subjects
Intercept .185581
r .0051590
e .0185435
r * Group .0039275
e * Group .0007678
40 subjects, 3200 observations. Log Likelihood: 1774
(B) Choice Model with OCD Patients
Intercept .2190821
r .0012207
e .0192052
20 subjects, 1600 observations. Log Likelihood: 953.9
(C) Choice Model with Control Subjects
Intercept .0781293
r .0051934
e .0186984
20 subjects, 1600 observations. Log Likelihood: 819.2
Panel A shows results from the choice model containing parameters avoida
Each coefficient in the full-choice model refers to the change in log odds per un
to control subjects, who are coded group ¼ 0 and do not represent the averag
choice behavior of the OCD patients and control subjects separately.e, expec
www.sobp.org/journalOCD patients may have a specific deficit in using forward models
of prospective action-outcome scenarios to guide behavior in a
goal-directed manner, while their ability to compare past coun-
terfactual scenarios is enhanced.
Obsessive-compulsive disorder commonly occurs with depres-
sion and anxiety (31), and although this study is limited by the
lack of a psychiatric control group, previous studies have shown
that these disorders are associated with the excessive generation
of counterfactuals thought to contribute to anxiety and rumina-
tion (33,34). The observation that OCD patients are particularly
sensitive to the experience of regret could suggest that the
symptom overlap between these disorders and OCD is attribut-
able to a common excess of backward counterfactual thinking,
a possible contributor to obsessive rumination. However, OCD
patients also exhibited more extreme emotional responsesividual Random Effects
Standard Error Z Value p Value
.0986051 1.507 .132
.0003671 14.054 .0001
.0018828 9.849 .0001
.0004828 8.135 .0001
.0025810 .297 .766
.1175509 1.864 .0624
.0003128 3.902 .0001
.0017594 10.916 .0001
.1614844 .484 .629
.0003687 14.087 .0001
.0018918 9.884 .0001
nce of regret (r) and expected value (e) and their interactions with group.
it change in the given predictor. Therefore, the main effects (r and e) refer
e of the groups. Panels B and C show results from applying the model to
ted value; OCD, obsessive-compulsive disorder; r, avoidance of regret.
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counterfactual comparison; OCD patients were simply more
pleased when they won and more disappointed when they lost.
Notably, the predictors that had an exaggerated effect on OCD
patients’ emotional responses constituted the most recent piece
of information presented to subjects on screen, over and above
other factors. At rating 1, this was the value of the obtained
outcome, and at rating 2, this was the value of the nonobtained
outcome from the wheel that was foregone. Therefore, this
pattern of affective responses in OCD patients may be better
characterized as heightened emotional reactivity rather than
counterfactual generation.
Since the observation that lesions to the OFC disrupt both the
experience and avoidance of regret (17), a number of neuro-
imaging studies have examined the role that this region plays in
both counterfactually mediated emotion and choice. A range of
paradigms and analytic approaches in functional magnetic
resonance imaging have provided convergent evidence for the
involvement of the OFC in the experience of regret (11,44–46).
Regret-related neural activity in the striatum (caudate nucleus
and putamen) has been observed in tasks involving a choice
between action and inaction (13,46–48) and may reflect a
counterfactual or fictive prediction error that adjusts future
behavior in light of counterfactual comparisons (49). The inter-
face of counterfactual emotion and action was assessed more
directly by Coricelli et al. (11), who observed that regions
involved in anticipating emotion and reflecting prior experience
of regret were active at the time of choice, suggesting that
avoiding regret might involve anticipating the future emotion.
The present study employed mathematical models to inves-
tigate the contribution of a number of predictors derived from
economic theories of decision making (8,10) to choice behavior
and affective responses in OCD. This approach to decision-
making analysis has been previously used in a number of studies
using this paradigm (11,17,18), facilitating comparison between
these clinical populations and allowing us to make inferences
regarding the neural basis of counterfactually mediated choice.
While these studies analyzed isolated categorical numeric com-
parisons (ignoring the majority of comparisons) to investigate
subjective experience of these counterfactuals, we adopted a
continuous strategy using linear regression. This allowed us to
examine the complete range of data points and therefore
optimize our analysis.
Obsessive-compulsive disorder patients in this study were
medicated, predominantly with SSRIs, posing a limitation to
interpretation. No studies have directly assessed the contribution
of serotonin to regret and its avoidance. However, the literature
suggests that SSRI treatment would likely attenuate, not exacerbate,
emotional responses (50–53). Decision making has also been shown
to be amenable to serotonergic influence (54); however, no study
has directly tested the role of serotonin in counterfactual choice.
One study found that serotonin depletion impaired learning about
the relationship between past actions and future aversive outcomes
(55), suggesting that SSRIs might have the opposite effect than
what we have observed. Nevertheless, possible effects of SSRIs on
counterfactual decision making awaits direct test.
This study identifies specific decision-making abnormalities in
OCD patients that reflect a lack of forward counterfactual
comparison between potential action-outcome scenarios. This
finding is consistent with the hypothesis that OCD patients have
a deficit in goal-directed control over action (4). Interestingly, we
cannot exclude the possibility that by taking the optimum long-
term strategy based on expected value, OCD patients generatedsuperior long-term forward models to healthy control subjects,
electing to experience regret on a trial-by-trial basis in an attempt
to avoid the ultimate regret associated with not earning the
maximum total points. This account, however, is limited by the
fact that OCD patients did not use expected value to a greater
extent than control subjects. In addition to this decision-making
abnormality, we found that OCD patients were more emotionally
reactive to the outcomes of their actions, an effect that was
specific to recently presented outcomes. Together, these findings
suggest that a parsimonious account of our observations might
be a lack of top-down cognitive control in OCD, an overlapping
component of impulsivity and compulsivity (56).
A deficit in the use of counterfactual comparison of future
outcomes may underlie the stimulus-driven behaviors that OCD
patients feel compelled to perform, in spite of the adverse future
consequences. This study, however, does not rule out the possi-
bility that OCD patients also have an overactive habit system;
rather, it suggests that deficient processing of future goals likely
contributes to their tendency toward compulsive habit behavior.
Future research should investigate whether this can fully account
for compulsivity in OCD or if excessive stimulus-response habit
formation is also a contributor. Indeed, a multifactor explanation
might mediate the heterogeneity of both symptom presentation
and pharmacologic treatment response evident in OCD.
This research was funded by a Wellcome Trust Grant (089589/Z/
09/Z) awarded to T.W. Robbins, B.J. Everitt, A.C. Roberts, J.W. Dalley,
and B.J. Sahakian, and it was conducted at the Behavioural and
Clinical Neuroscience Institute, which is supported by a joint award
from the Medical Research Council and Wellcome Trust
(G00001354). CMG is supported by a studentship from the Medical
Research Council. S. Morein-Zamir is supported by the Wellcome
Trust Grant above. R.N. Cardinal is supported by a Wellcome Trust
Postdoctoral Fellowship (091998/Z/10/Z). MK was supported by a
travel Grant from Turkish Brain Research Organization and the
postdoctoral research award by The Scientific and Technological
Research Council of Turkey.
We thank all of the volunteers who participated in this study. We
thank Dr. Martin O’Neill and our referees for their constructive
comments.
The authors report no biomedical financial interests or potential
conflicts of interest.
Supplementary material cited in this article is available online at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsych.2013.01.018.
1. American Psychiatric Association. (2000): Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th Edition, Text Revision. Washington, DC:
American Psychiatric Association.
2. Meyer V (1966): Modification of expectations in cases with obses-
sional rituals. Behav Res Ther 4:273–280.
3. Graybiel AM, Rauch SL (2000): Toward a neurobiology of obsessive-
compulsive disorder. Neuron 28:343–347.
4. Gillan CM, Papmeyer M, Morein-Zamir S, Sahakian BJ, Fineberg NA,
Robbins TW, de Wit S (2011): Disruption in the balance between goal-
directed behavior and habit learning in obsessive-compulsive disor-
der. Am J Psychiatry 168:718–726.
5. Montague PR, Dolan RJ, Friston KJ, Dayan P (2012): Computational
psychiatry. Trends Cogn Sci 16:72–80.
6. Saxena S, Brody AL, Schwartz JM, Baxter LR (1998): Neuroimaging and
frontal-subcortical circuitry in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Br J
Psychiatry 173:26–37.
7. Balleine BW, O’Doherty JP (2010): Human and rodent homologies in
action control: Corticostriatal determinants of goal-directed and
habitual action. Neuropsychopharmacology 35:48–69.www.sobp.org/journal
646 BIOL PSYCHIATRY 2014;75:639–646 C.M. Gillan et al.8. Kahneman D, Tversky A (1979): Prospect theory - analysis of decision
under risk. Econometrica 47:263–291.
9. Mellers B, Schwartz A, Ritov I (1999): Emotion-based choice. J Exp
Psychol 128:332–345.
10. Loomes G, Sugden R (1982): Regret theory - an alternative theory of
rational choice under uncertainty. Economic Journal 92:805–824.
11. Coricelli G, Critchley HD, Joffily M, O’Doherty JP, Sirigu A, Dolan RJ
(2005): Regret and its avoidance: A neuroimaging study of choice
behavior. Nat Neurosci 8:1255–1262.
12. Kuhnen CM, Knutson B (2005): The neural basis of financial risk taking.
Neuron 47:763–770.
13. Lohrenz T, McCabe K, Camerer CF, Montague PR (2007): Neural
signature of fictive learning signals in a sequential investment task.
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 104:9493–9498.
14. Camille N, Pironti VA, Dodds CM, Aitken MR, Robbins TW, Clark L
(2010): Striatal sensitivity to personal responsibility in a regret-based
decision-making task. Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci 10:460–469.
15. Epstude K, Roese N (2011): When goal pursuit fails the functions of
counterfactual thought in intention formation. Soc Psychol 42:19–27.
16. Zeelenberg M (1999): Anticipated regret, expected feedback and
behavioral decision making. J Behav Decis Mak 12:93–106.
17. Camille N, Coricelli G, Sallet J, Pradat-Diehl P, Duhamel JR, Sirigu A
(2004): The involvement of the orbitofrontal cortex in the experience
of regret. Science 304:1167–1170.
18. Larquet M, Coricelli G, Opolczynski G, Thibaut F (2010): Impaired
decision making in schizophrenia and orbitofrontal cortex lesion
patients. Schizophr Res 116:266–273.
19. Rolls ET, Hornak J, Wade D, McGrath J (1994): Emotion-related learning
in patients with social and emotional changes associated with frontal
lobe damage. J Neurol Neurosurg Psychiatry 57:1518–1524.
20. Bechara A, Damasio AR, Damasio H, Anderson SW (1994): Insensitivity
to future consequences following damage to human prefrontal
cortex. Cognition 50:7–15.
21. Bechara A (2004): The role of emotion in decision-making: Evidence from
neurological patients with orbitofrontal damage. Brain Cogn 55:30–40.
22. Nakamura M, Nestor PG, Levitt JJ, Cohen AS, Kawashima T, Shenton
ME, McCarley RW (2008): Orbitofrontal volume deficit in schizophrenia
and thought disorder. Brain 131:180–195.
23. Hooker C, Roese NJ, Park S (2000): Impoverished counterfactual
thinking is associated with schizophrenia. Psychiatry 63:326–335.
24. Roese NJ, Park S, Gibson C, Smallman R (2008): Schizophrenia involves
impairment in the activation of intentions by counterfactual thinking.
Schizophr Res 103:343–344.
25. Epstude K, Roese N (2008): The functional theory of counterfactual
thinking. Person Soc Psychol Rev 12:168–192.
26. Liddle PF, Morris DL (1991): Schizophrenic syndromes and frontal-lobe
performance. Br J Psychiatry 158:340–345.
27. Chamberlain SR, Fineberg NA, Menzies LA, Blackwell AD, Bullmore ET,
Robbins TW, Sahakian BJ (2007): Impaired cognitive flexibility and
motor inhibition in unaffected first-degree relatives of patients with
obsessive-compulsive disorder. Am J Psychiatry 164:335–338.
28. Berlin HA, Rolls ET, Kischka U (2004): Impulsivity, time perception,
emotion and reinforcement sensitivity in patients with orbitofrontal
cortex lesions. Brain 127:1108–1126.
29. Salkovskis PM, Wroe AL, Gledhill A, Morrison N, Forrester E, Richards C,
et al. (2000): Responsibility attitudes and interpretations are character-
istic of obsessive compulsive disorder. Behav Res Ther 38:347–372.
30. Zeelenberg M, van der Pligt J, de Vries NK (2000): Attributions of
responsibility and affective reactions to decision outcomes. Acta
Psychol (Amst) 104:303–315.
31. Bienvenu OJ, Samuels JF, Wuyek LA, Liang KY, Wang Y, Grados MA,
et al. (2012): Is obsessive-compulsive disorder an anxiety disorder, and
what, if any, are spectrum conditions? A family study perspective.
Psychol Med 42:1–13.
32. Monroe M, Skowronski J, MacDonald W, Wood S (2005): The mildly
depressed experience more post-decisional regret than the non-
depressed. J Soc Clin Psychol 24:665–690.www.sobp.org/journal33. Roese N, Epstude K, Fessel F, Morrison M, Smallman R, Summerville A,
et al. (2009): Repetitive regret, depression, and anxiety: Findings from
a nationally representative survey. J Soc Clin Psychol 28:671–688.
34. Kocovski N, Endler N, Rector N, Flett G (2005): Ruminative coping and
post-event processing in social anxiety. Behav Res Ther 43:971–984.
35. Markman K, Miller A (2006): Depression, control, and counterfactual
thinking: Functional for whom? J Soc Clin Psychol 25:210–227.
36. Quelhas AC, Power MJ, Juhos C, Senos J (2008): Counterfactual
thinking and functional differences in depression. Clin Psychol
Psychother 15:352–365.
37. Chase HW, Camille N, Michael A, Bullmore ET, Robbins TW, Sahakian
BJ (2010): Regret and the negative evaluation of decision outcomes in
major depression. Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci 10:406–413.
38. Nelson HE (1982): National Adult Reading Test (NART): Test Manual.
Windsor, UK: NFER-Nelson.
39. Foa EB, Huppert JD, Leiberg S, Langner R, Kichic R, Hajcak G,
Salkovskis PM (2002): The Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory: Develop-
ment and validation of a short version. Psychol Assess 14:485–496.
40. Montgomery SA, Asberg M (1979): A new depression scale designed
to be sensitive to change. Br J Psychiatry 134:382–389.
41. Spielberger CD (1983): Manual for the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory
STAI. Palo Alto, CA: Mind Garden.
42. Baayen R, Davidson D, Bates D (2008): Mixed-effects modeling with
crossed random effects for subjects and items. J Mem Lang 59:
390–412.
43. Nagelkerke NJ (1991): A note on a general definition of the coefficient
of determination. Biometrika 78.
44. Chua HF, Gonzalez R, Taylor SF, Welsh RC, Liberzon I (2009): Decision-
related loss: Regret and disappointment. Neuroimage 47:2031–2040.
45. Chandrasekhar PVS, Capra CM, Moore S, Noussair C, Berns GS (2008):
Neurobiological regret and rejoice functions for aversive outcomes.
Neuroimage 39:1472–1484.
46. Liu X, Powell DK, Wang H, Gold BT, Corbly CR, Joseph JE (2007):
Functional dissociation in frontal and striatal areas for processing of
positive and negative reward information. J Neurosci 27:4587–4597.
47. Chiu PH, Lohrenz TM, Montague PR (2008): Smokers’ brains compute,
but ignore, a fictive error signal in a sequential investment task. Nat
Neurosci 11:514–520.
48. Camille N, Pironti V, Dodds C, Aitken M, Robbins T, Clark L (2010):
Striatal sensitivity to personal responsibility in a regret-based deci-
sion-making task. Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci 10:460–469.
49. Sommer T, Peters J, Glaescher J, Buechel C (2009): Structure-function
relationships in the processing of regret in the orbitofrontal cortex.
Brain Struc Function 213:535–551.
50. van der Veen FM, Evers EAT, Deutz NEP, Schmitt JAJ (2007): Effects of
acute tryptophan depletion on mood and facial emotion perception
related brain activation and performance in healthy women with and
without a family history of depression. Neuropsychopharmacology 32:
216–224.
51. Arce E, Simmons AN, Lovero KL, Stein MB, Paulus MP (2008):
Escitalopram effects on insula and amygdala BOLD activation during
emotional processing. Psychopharmacology (Berl) 196:661–672.
52. Harmer CJ, Mackay CE, Reid CB, Cowen PJ, Goodwin GM (2006):
Antidepressant drug treatment modifies the neural processing of
nonconscious threat cues. Biol Psychiatry 59:816–820.
53. Cools R, Roberts AC, Robbins TW (2008): Serotoninergic regulation of
emotional and behavioural control processes. Trends Cogn Sci 12:
31–40.
54. Rogers RD, Tunbridge EM, Bhagwagar Z, Drevets WC, Sahakian BJ,
Carter CS (2003): Tryptophan depletion alters the decision-making of
healthy volunteers through altered processing of reward cues.
Neuropsychopharmacology 28:153–162.
55. Tanaka SC, Shishida K, Schweighofer N, Okamoto Y, Yamawaki S, Doya
K (2009): Serotonin affects association of aversive outcomes to past
actions. J Neurosci 29:15669–15674.
56. Dalley JW, Everitt BJ, Robbins TW (2011): Impulsivity, compulsivity,
and top-down cognitive control. Neuron 69:680–694.
